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The East Asian model was once hailed by the world as a miracle that other developing countries should aspire to 
(World Bank, 1993). However, the slowdown of the Japanese economy and the Asian Financial Crisis seemed to 
have rendered the East Asian model obsolete. In particular, the pro-active role of the government that was once 
regarded as central to the East Asian model has been subject to rethinking and even rebuffing (Stiglitz and Yusef, 
2001). In this paper, I will first argue that the seemingly declining of the East Asian economies is a phenomenon of 
the transition from a catch-up economy to a mature economy, and it will be only temporary if the transition is 
successfully managed. Then I will argue that the core of the East Asian model is the existence of the encompassing 
state, i.e., a state that is keen to represent the long-term interests of the country. I will show that the 
underdevelopment of other developing countries is exactly due to the lack of such a state. I emphasize the role of 
East Asia’s unique historical and cultural heritages in bringing about such a state in that region. I also point out that 
the encompassing state should opt for a major change after the catch-up period finishes. At the end of the paper, I 
will discuss the future of the encompassing state in a democratic society. 
The Change of the Development Model 
It has been long debated whether a catch-up development model is viable in the long run. In my view, this debate 
itself is ill placed, for two reasons. First, development by definition is a catch-up process because its aim is to finish 
in several decades the development process that the present industrial economies took 100-200 years to accomplish. 
Developing economies can never be satisfied with an annual growth rate of 2 per cent, though it might be a 
respectable record for industrial economies. Nor will they be satisfied either by the record—high growth rates, i.e., 5 
to 6 per cent, experienced by the industrial economies in their history. For catch-up to happen in a short period of 
time, a growth rate higher than 7 per cent has been regarded as the norm. Second, catch-up automatically has a limit, 
that is, it stops when the catching-up economy reaches a pre-set objective (for China, for example, this objective is 
to reach the middle-income level). Therefore, it is a void question that whether the catch-up strategy is viable in the 
long run. If we admit that development is catch-up, the relevant question then changes to how to catch up instead of 
whether to catch up. This naturally leads us to study the factors that promote catch-up. 
Developing countries all start at very low levels of physical and human capital stocks, technology, and 
managerial skills. With limited resources, it is thus critical to find a wise usage of them. Two factors thus have 
become very important in the searching of such a use. The first is scale economies. Modern technologies are 
characterized by significant scale economies. Market size, for instance, is critical for a modern technology to survive. 
This was emphasized by the classical development economists such as P. Rosensten-Rodan and A. Hirschman, but 
had been forgotten for decades before the new growth model began to treat scale economies seriously. The second is 
coordination failures arising from the lack of information. Let me use an example for illustration. Suppose that an 
economy is only comprised of two firms. Firm A produces cars, and firm B produces steel. Both have scale 
economies. If both expand their production, then both can make profits because B finds A a major buyer of steel, 
and A can sell more cars because the income of the workers in both firms increases. However, if B is unsure about 
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A’s production capacity, it will not expand its production of steel because it fears that it cannot sell its steel. In 
addition, if it is unsure about the market demand, A will not expand its production of cars. In both cases, the society 
loses the opportunity to increase its GDP.  
To overcome the hurdle set by the scale economies, East Asian economies have developed several effective 
strategies. Exporting is certainly high on the list and has been hailed by some people as the single most important 
key to the East Asian miracle. While the role of exports can be understated, one needs to realize that exporting is a 
way to overcome the limitation of the domestic markets. In this sense, exporting is a passive strategy. What I want 
to elaborate in this paper are two other strategies that have international significance but have not been fully 
appreciated by the world.  
The first is the build-up of a set of solid manufacturing capacities. At the very be say, ginning of their 
development, East Asian economies relied heavily on agriculture to generate income. The manufacturing sector 
barely existed. One alternative for those economies to join the rank of the industrial economies would have been to 
follow the example of the old capitalist economies, say, Great Britain, but that would have forced them to wait for 
two hundred years in order to finish the catch-up. A fast build-up of the manufacturing basis is needed if a 
developing economy wants to shorten the catching-up process. Toward that end, some protection is needed when an 
economy is building up its domestic manufacturing capacities. However, as it so often happens, the liberal camp 
deliberately ignores the fact that all the East Asian economies experienced a period of import substitution and, until 
very recently, it had imposed restrictive custom policies toward imports. If it is transformed into efforts to realize 
full-fledge self-reliance, like what happened in the planning period of China, India before its recent reform, and 
Latin America before the 1990s, the import substitution policy is doomed to fail because it cuts off a country’s ties 
with the rest of the world and prevents it from benefiting from trading with other countries. The key to the success 
of the East Asian economies is that they have been conscious of the adverse effects of import substitution and have 
intended to use the policy to build their own industrial capacities. Take the example of China. To a large extent, the 
planning period of China was a failure. But it failed more in the political rather than in the economic sense. The 
industrial capacities—heavy industries and a well-trained workforce—built up in the 1950s and to a lesser extent in 
the 1960s have played an important role in gaining China’s unprecedented growth record in the reform period. 
Without such industrial capacities, China’s economic growth rate would be unimaginable. In particular, without a 
well-trained workforce, it would also have been unimaginable that China could attract so much foreign direct 
investment. The cost of the capacity build-up, however, was the distortion of the economy that put too much 
emphasis on heavy industries. But the good thing was that Chinese scholars and policy makers were aware of this 
cost. Mao Zedong discussed the problem in his famous work On Ten Major Relations published in 1957. As soon as 
the political atmosphere was allowed toward the end of the 1970s, a renewed discussion on the policy started and the 
result was the open-door policy and the flourishing of the light industries and agriculture. 
The second strategy adopted by the East Asian economies in overcoming the hurdle of the scale economies is to 
identify sectors that have the highest potentials to illicit demand or to bring backward and forward linkages. Both 
help to enlarge the market and for that matter increase national income. The most serious constraint faced by any 
developing economy is the lack of capital. In the early stage of development, it is wise to concentrate the limited 
resources on a few promising sectors. To use the management jargon, such strategy is equivalent in finding the 
sectors that the economy has the highest potential to be competitive in the world market. Competitiveness is not 
only defined by efficiency, but also defined by raising the national income (Reinert, 1995). The most successful case 
of building up national competitiveness is the semi-conductor industry in Korea. Korea started R&D in the semi-
conductor industry in as early as the late 1970s. This long lasting effort has paid off: Korea now is the second largest 
chip producer in the world, only behind Japan. 
This is related to the East Asian governments’ strategy to overcome the coordination problem. They have been 
deeply engaged in activities that are regarded as private businesses in the industrial economies. Before the Asian 
Financial Crisis, bank lending in Korea was largely directed by the government to support certain industries. In 
Japan, government intervention has been more subtle. Persuasion replaces order to direct investments, and 
government officials exert their influences more through the chamber of commerce and other civil organizations 
(Aoki et al., 1996). 
These strategies have largely paid off. However, they only fit into the early stage of development when the 
economy maintains a manageable size. At that time, information was not a serious problem for centralized 
investment decisions and the failure rate was relatively low. As long as the industrial basis was built up, the 
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economy provided a larger space for diverse industries to flourish; in addition, more manufacturing sectors would 
have developed through the linkage and income effects. At this stage, centralized investment decisions lose at two 
fronts. If the investment still concentrates in a few sectors, other sectors will not have a chance to grow because of 
the lack of capital. If the investment is dispersed into many sectors, then information will become a serious problem. 
The failure of the socialist planning is but one example. Therefore, it is vital for an economy to change its 
development strategy when it reaches a certain point of development. The hard problem is to identify such a turning 
point. It was unfortunate that it needed a crisis for the East Asian economies to realize that it was time for a change. 
For Japan, it was the slowdown of its economy in the 1990s that brought in the change, and for Korea, it was the 
financial crisis that did the same thing. The point that I want to elaborate here is that the East Asian economies are 
able to absorb the shocks and accept the change in a rational way. In this process, the role of the government cannot 
be ignored. This is now clearer in Korea than in any other economy. The nationalist sentiment was high in Korea 
after the financial crisis, and large-scale protests happened everyday against the selling of Korean banks and 
companies. The Korean government defied the populist pressure and implemented most of the selling plans. This 
then leads us to the discussion of the role played by the government in the East Asian miracle. 
The Encompassing State 
The role of the government in East Asian economic development has been intensively discussed. For the liberal 
camp, the role of the government was irrelevant, if not negative, in the East Asian miracle. All what was needed was 
the functioning of the free market, especially those related to exports. For others, the government in East Asia 
played an active and positive role in fostering their economic development. From this view came the phrase the 
developmental state (World Bank, 1993). Some people even went further to suggest that the East Asian governments 
also engaged in interventional activities that defied the orthodox doctrines of the standard economics by deliberately 
“getting the price wrong” (Amsden, 1989). A third view tries to mediate between the above two views by proposing 
the market-enhancing thesis. As Aoki et al. (1996) tried to argue, governments in the East Asian economies played 
an active role in their economic development, but their intention was not to replace the market in resource allocation, 
but rather to enhance the market’s functions. The debate will not likely to be settled. What I want to discuss here is 
not the merits or shortcomings of the above three views, rather, I would like to approach the issue from another 
angle. The above three views all revolve around the relationship between the government and the market, discussing 
whether the two are substitutes or complements to each other. My approach is to move the discussion beyond this 
market-state delineation, and to enter the discussion of the political economy of the state.  
For many developing countries, the failure to catch up is not caused by the lack of the market, but rather the lack 
of good governance. Myrdal’s classical study of Southeast Asia can attest it (Myrdal, 1972). Good governance may 
have many forms, each of which is suitable only for a specific context. Democracy can be a good form of 
governance in a country with homogenous residents and stable economic and social environments, but may not be as 
effective in a developing country. Democracy is a passive aggregating device. Under normal conditions,i it can 
prevent disastrous events, but it cannot provide the impetus that is necessary for catch-up. As the classical works of 
Mancur Olson have convincingly shown, democracy tends to foster interest groups that care more about distribution 
rather than economic growth, and for that matter, democracy tends to react slowly toward the changes of the 
economic environment (Olson, 1982). For catch-up to happen, a more active state is needed.  
Yet we do not want to have a Leviathan. We want to have an active state with a considerable amount of limits 
placed on it. Such a state can be authoritative, but lies far away from a dictatorship. I call such a state the 
“encompassing state.” An encompassing state maintains a clear goal to maximize the long-run aggregate welfare of 
the country. This requires that the encompassing state be a utilitarian that stands still against interest group pressures. 
In many cases it implies sacrificing the interests of some groups to exchange for the advancement of the whole 
country. As such, persuasion and coercion may happen. To avoid social unrest, though, the encompassing state also 
possesses another feature of maintaining a fairly equal income distribution by deliberately designed industrial and 
employment policies. These features distinguish the encompassing state from other types of authoritative states. It 
differs from the dictatorship in that the dictator only cares about his own and his cronies’ interests but ignores the 
interests of the country; it differs from the populist state in that it does not bend to the populist pressure to 
redistribute; and it differs from the Soviet-style socialism in that it is open to all kinds of ownership and admits the 
market as the fundamental tool for resource allocation. 
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Catch-up needs the concentration of resources, a task that cannot be fulfilled by the market alone in the presence 
of scale economies and the coordination problem. In East Asia this task has been taken by the government. However, 
this government has to be effective and have a clearly defined goal. The encompassing state in East Asia provides 
exactly such a government. To reach the goal of catching-up, East Asian governments have adopted various 
measures, ranging from engaging in market-enhancing coordination to establish a socialist planning system, to 
accelerate capital accumulation and technological progress. For the encompassing state, the goal is more important 
than the means, so the three views about the government, the liberal view, the “getting-prices-wrong” view, and the 
market enhancing view, are meaningless. The encompassing state is pragmatic. 
As I reasoned in the first section, there will come a time when the catch-up strategy should be dropped. For East 
Asian governments, the challenge is to resist the pressures of vested interest groups not to change. The concentration 
of resources means that some sectors and even some firms are favored and some are not. Those with the favor would 
strongly oppose the change because they would lose their privileges once the change happened. The encompassing 
state stands still in front of the pressures. One example is the Korean government under the leadership of president 
Kim Dae-chung that pushed forward the economic transition after the Asian Financial Crisis hit Korea with severe 
consequences. Another example is the Chinese government under the leadership of premier Zhu Rongji that initiated 
a major structural adjustment and privatization program for the Chinese industry in the mid-1990s. A large number 
of SOEs closed and millions of workers lost their jobs. Although the adverse impacts can still be felt today, the 
structural adjustment has greatly strengthened China’s competitiveness and the privatization program has increased 
firm efficiency. 
Curiously enough, populist pressures could win their way in some authoritative regimes. The most telling 
example is Argentina under the rule of Piron. While he has been regarded as a dictator, Piron adopted strong 
populist policies in his two terms of presidency. The working class was systematically favored and redistribution 
was on a large scale. The result was that Argentina slipped from the group of high income countries in the early 20th 
century to barely a middle-income country. It would have been anticipated that the later Argentine leaders should 
have learned the lesson, but the populist legacy has lingered on. The culmination of this legacy was the 2002 
financial crisis. The dollarization of the Argentine economy was designed to bind the monetary authority’s hand not 
to engage in inflationary expansion. The initial outcome was very encouraging, hyper-inflation was curbed. 
However, the government did not tie its own hand in handing out social welfare. Under the populist pressure, the 
government had to keep up its welfare spending. This, coupled with Argentina’s bad trade records, had shaken the 
confidence of the ordinary Argentine perple. Thus there was a run on the bank, which eventually caused the collapse 
of the Argentine peso. The East Asian governments have done a much better job than Piron and the recent Argentine 
government. Instead of engaging in large scale redistribution, the East Asian governments have encouraged the 
dissemination of benefits created by the leading sectors. In Korea, industries were concentrated in Soul and Pusan in 
the initial stage of development, but a large scale migration was encouraged and it enabled the residents in the rural 
areas to gain the benefits. In China, labor-intensive industries moved quickly to the countryside under localized rural 
industrialization. In the early stage of Japan’s economic development, labor-intensive industries were also 
encouraged. All these measures enhanced productivity and improved income distribution at the same time. As a 
result, the growing pie is accompanied by a fair distribution among the population. 
The encompassing state is endowed with power that is beyond the scope of a democratic government. While it is 
necessary for economic catch-up, the concentration of power has detrimental effects and even disastrous 
consequences in the political arena. It is so easy for the ruling group to use the power to pursue its own interests, so 
corruption and political suppression are common. East Asia had lived with the dilemma through its earlier 
development stage; with catching-up as its paramount goal, it had opted for favoring economic development rather 
than political freedom. However, the change of the economic model calls for the change in the political arena. With 
catch-up approaching its end, the concentration of power has lost its causes, and decentralized economic decisions 
call for economic democracy. The most significant consequence that this trend brings about for the political arena is 
the diversification of the political basis and the creation of a large middle class, which make political democracy 
inevitable. Korea has gone through this process, but Singapore has lagged behind. 
Historical and Cultural Roots of the Encompassing State 
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Why has the encompassing state emerged in East Asia, but not in other regions? I believe that this has a lot to do 
with the history and culture of East Asia. In the recent history, East Asia were subject to imperialist invasions and 
colonization. Japan’s door was forced open by the American fleet, and China’s door was forced open by the joint 
forces of the western powers. Korea’s case is unique. It was the battlefield of imperial China and Japan and after 
China’s defeat in the Yellow Sea in 1894, Korea fell into a colony of Japan. Although the causes and extent of the 
imperial suppression varied among the three countries, the humiliation had been the same. Against it is the strong 
historical and cultural pride shared by all the three countries, and the tension has become one of the strongest 
impetuses for them to catch up with the world powers in all spheres. 
Singapore is a city state that has gained independence for only 40 years. For her the only way to gain 
international recognition is to succeed economically. Thanks to the great leadership of Lee Kwan-yew and his 
personal charisma, Singapore has become the most competitive economy in the world. 
History matters, but let us not forget the role of culture. There are many other countries that had a long history of 
imperial invasion and colonization, noticeably, those in sub-Sahara Africa, but the encompassing state has never 
taken roots there. I believe that Confucianism has been a vital factor for the survival of the encompassing state in 
East Asia. Confucianism believes in goodness and requires that the ruler be a good person and rule the country with 
good governance. This gives the ruler a serious moral constraint. Even in the Ming Dynasty, when the emperor 
began to gain absolute power, daring government officials still frequently appealed to morality to challenge the 
emperor’s rules (Huang, 1981). Today morality is still important in China’s political life. On the other hand, respect 
to collective interests and obedience to authority are core values of Confucianism. This makes the ruling easier. As a 
friend put it when he commented on Singapore: “Singapore has a government that is good at governing and a people 
that is willing to be governed.” I believe that this comment can readily apply to the other countries in East Asia. 
The Future of the Encompassing State 
After catch-up concludes, it seems that the encompassing state has lost its reason for existence. Indeed, its 
economic functions are no longer useful, and its political monopoly will be replaced by democracy. The 
encompassing state as a form of state governance should stop. I would like to argue, however, that the ideas of the 
encompassing state should be preserved in a democracy. Popular participation will flourish in a democracy, but so 
will interest group activities. Indeed, redistributive interest groups were believed by Olson as the most serious 
challenge to democracy (Olson, 1982). He believed that the relative decline of Great Britain after the Second World 
War was the consequence of too many redistributive interest groups in that country. Democracy can be very passive 
if it yields to the demand of the redistributive interest groups. In the newly democratization countries in the former 
Soviet Union, democracy is even hijacked by powerful oligarchies. Therefore, the very idea of the encompassing 
state to resist interest group pressures is still valuable in a democracy. Besides, democracy can also increase the 
populist pressure on the government. The recent defeat of the Vajpayee government in the Indian election highlights 
this point. The Vajpayee government had made great achievements in economic reforms and growth, and the world 
has begun to talk about India as the next Asian giant that has the potential to take over China. However, the reforms 
and economic growth have not benefited the vast majority in the countryside to the same extent as they have 
benefited the elite sectors, which gave the Congress party a chance to win the election. It has a deep historical root 
for the failure of the Vajpayee government to raise the rural living standard as fast as the urban living standard, 
including Congress party’s own socialist planning policies. It needs time to revert the historical trend. But people 
cannot wait. It is widely expected that the Congress coalition government will engage in more redistributions. Like 
interest group activities, populism has the same effects to retard a country’s economic growth. Therefore, the idea of 
the encompassing state still have a value in a democracy. 
Yet the implementation of the idea should be very different. In the catch-up period, the idea is attached to and 
implemented by the centralized state governance. Now that the state governance is democratized, such a way is no 
longer feasible. We need to find new ways. I do not have subscriptions at this stage, and would like to subscribe to 
professor Amartya Sen’s call to submit the matter to open public discussions. Open and democratic discussions 
allow people of all walks to express their ideas, so interest groups do not dominate. In addition, such discussions can 
serve as an important vehicle for consensus building. If the efforts succeed, East Asia will make another 
contribution to the world. 
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i Let us not forget that Hitler was appointed as the German chancellor through democratic process. 
